

On the Issue of Withdrawing Foreign Troops from South Vietnam during the Paris Negotiations (1968-1973)

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Abstract: After nearly 5 years (from May 13, 1968, ending on January 27, 1973) negotiations with 201 public meetings, 45 high-level private meetings, 500 press conferences, 1,000 interviews The Paris Agreement negotiations have ended. The development of the Paris Conference was very tense with the conflicting demands of Vietnam and the US. Vietnam demands that the US end the war, withdraw all troops and weapons from South Vietnam, abolish the pro-American government, and respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination... The US said it wanted to end the war, but demanded that the North and the US withdraw their troops together; demanded the restoration of the demilitarized zone and the maintenance of the Saigon government. However, in the end the US had to sign the Paris Agreement with the victory in favor of Vietnam. When looking back at the war in Vietnam, many international commentators commented: The Paris Conference is the most eloquent picture of the historical confrontation between socialists on the one hand and capitalism on the other, and the Paris Agreement is the “legend of the twentieth century”.

Keywords: Army, Paris negotiations, Paris Agreement, Vietnam, USA

INTRODUCTION

The positions of Vietnam and the US when coming to the Paris Conference with opposing purposes and requirements. Vietnam demanded that the US end the war of aggression, withdraw all troops and weapons from South Vietnam, abolish the pro-US government, respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination... the US said it wanted to stop it. war, but demanded that the North and the US withdraw their troops together; demanding restoration of the demilitarized zone and maintaining the government of Saigon; means continuing to maintain the new colonial regime in the South, permanently dividing Vietnam (Ha Dang, 2008).

Negotiating and coming to the conclusion of the Paris Agreement is not a bloodshed, but it is a fierce and tough battle of wits between the “masters” of Vietnamese and American diplomacy. On the conference table, one side is the United States, which is very experienced in international negotiations, and on the other hand, Vietnam is young but smart. The Vietnamese delegation gave the US a draft Agreement with provisions requiring the US to withdraw all troops from South Vietnam. The American delegation also requested that the pro-Northern military forces be withdrawn from the southern battlefield (Vietpeace, 2013).

The victory of the Paris Agreement left for the Vietnamese revolution and Vietnamese diplomacy many valuable lessons. That is a lesson in steadfastly following the path of independence and self-reliance associated with international solidarity, combining the

strength of the whole nation with the strength of the times; know how to make concessions with principles, persist in principles, be flexible in strategies, proactively create opportunities, seize opportunities, know to win step by step, towards the final victory. It is also a lesson on close and skillful coordination between military, political and diplomatic struggles, properly assessing the situation of the parties, skillfully applying the art of fighting and negotiating; always grasp the public advantage both on the battlefield and on the conference table, take advantage of the victory on the battlefield for the offensive position in negotiations and vice versa, make full use of beneficial directions through negotiation to promote activities action on the battlefield, making the battlefield and negotiating, the two fronts become one, inseparable (Vu ChienThang, 2018)

Diplomacy is an important front, associated with the nation's destiny and always has an organic relationship with the military and political front in order to promote and support each other to realize the common goal of national independence and unify the country. That relationship is clearly demonstrated: at the negotiating table cannot be won without victory on the battlefield and victories on the battlefield will not be confirmed without the art of winning at the negotiating table. Victory at the negotiating table will create favorable conditions for greater victory on the battlefield, and victory on the battlefield will directly determine victory at the negotiating table. The Paris Agreement is the result of a harmonious coordination between the military, political and diplomatic fronts, demonstrating the culmination of the art of “fighting and talking at the same time”, creating a historic step for the Vietnamese people. Nam is determined to join hands to complete the cause of national liberation (Pham ThiNhung, 2013).

Diplomacy at this time is not only an ordinary negotiation but also a “war without gunfire” by diplomats of all sides and has a great influence on the final outcome of the 1972 war as well as on the whole world. Vietnam War Department. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam side considers the Paris Conference not only ordinary diplomatic negotiations but also a front. That front was not only meant to propagate the Vietnamese people's struggle for national independence, but also to confirm the results of the armed and political struggles on the battlefields of South Vietnam. (Alain Wasmès, 2004, p. 12)

Assessing the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam, in the article “Paris Conference and valuable lessons for Vietnamese diplomacy” commented: The Paris Agreement is extremely important for the cause of the struggle for international peace, liberate and unify the country of the Vietnamese people. The Agreement is the most comprehensive and complete legal document that recognizes the basic rights of the Vietnamese people, in which the US is forced to commit to “respecting Vietnam's independence, unity and territorial integrity”. The Paris Conference and the Paris Agreement made an important contribution to the effort to create a strategic shift in the nation's resistance war against America to save the country, step by step forcing the US to come to a solution, stop bombing the North, withdraw all American troops and vassals from the South. By forcing the US to withdraw while Vietnam fully maintained its forces, the Agreement opened up a new situation, comparing forces on the battlefield in favor of Vietnam (Pham Binh Minh, 2013).

Research Questions

The article focuses on clarifying research questions:

1. How was the meeting between Vietnam and the United States at the Paris Conference?

2. What is the position of Vietnam and the United States in withdrawing their troops at the Paris Conference?
3. Why do Vietnam and the US have opposing views on troop withdrawal?

Developments of meetings between Vietnam and the United States at the Paris Conference

The Paris Conference on Vietnam was the longest negotiation to end a longest war of the twentieth century. It is also a dialogue between two diplomacy - the professional diplomacy of a superpower and the diplomacy of a fledgling revolutionary state. At the Paris Conference, there was a fierce struggle between two wills, two minds, two types of law and morality, whit two different strategies.

The direct cause of the Paris Conference was that developments on the battlefields of South Vietnam were not favorable to the United States. Vietnam's 1968 General Offensive and Uprising has changed the battle, overturned strategy, but also shaken the will of the United States. The United States wants to get out of the war through negotiation.

Phase 1: is a two-way negotiation between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States, lasting for six months from May 13 to the end of October 1968.

Phase 2: is the four-way negotiation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, later the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the United States and the Saigon government. , lasted four years, from January 1969 to January 1973 (National Archives, 1972, Document No. 16),. The conference has the following important milestones:

On May 13, 1968, the Paris Conference between the two sides opened. Due to the resolute stance of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the United States was forced to sit down and talk officially with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and from June 1969, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. South Vietnam.

On January 18, 1969, the first session of the Paris Conference on Vietnam opened in the meeting room of the International Convention Center in Paris. Four delegations of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, the United States and the Saigon government discussed the preparation for the first plenary session.

On January 25, 1969, the first plenary session of the Four-Party Conference on Vietnam opened in Paris.

During the negotiation process, on May 8, 1969, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam proposed a ten-point peaceful solution. On May 14, 1969, the US side made an eight-point proposal.

On June 8, 1969, US President Richard Nixon announced the first withdrawal of 25,000 troops from South Vietnam.

On June 10, 1969, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam decided that the delegation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam at the Paris Conference on Vietnam would now become the Government delegation. The Provisional Revolution of the Republic of South Vietnam at the Paris Conference on

Vietnam, led by Ms. Nguyen ThiBinh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

On August 4, 1969, Dr. Henry Kissinger, the White House's national security adviser, secretly met Minister Xuan Thuy for the first time in Paris.

On August 25, 1969, President Ho Chi Minh replied to a letter from US President Richard Milhous Nixon. In order to have peace, the United States must stop the war of aggression and withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, respecting the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people and of the Vietnamese people. That was the way for America to withdraw from the war with honor.

On February 21, 1970, special advisor Le DucTho and Minister Xuan Thuy met Henry Alfre Kissinger. From there began a private meeting between special advisor Le DucTho and Henry Kissinger.

In March 1970, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party decided to step up military, political and diplomatic activities, demanding the establishment of a coalition government in South Vietnam.

On September 17, 1970, at the 84th plenary session of the Paris Conference on Vietnam, Minister Nguyen ThiBinh made an eight-point proposal - clarifying more about a political solution to the Vietnam problem, including the withdrawal of American troops and the release of prisoners at the same time and the establishment of a provisional coalition government in South Vietnam.

On October 18, 1970, President Richard Nixon made a Five-point proposal that did not require North Vietnamese troops to withdraw from South Vietnam.

On December 10, 1970, during the 94th plenary session of the Paris Conference on Vietnam, Minister Nguyen ThiBinh made a three-point proposal for a ceasefire, demanding that US troops withdraw from the South on June 30. -1971.

On May 31, 1971, at a private meeting between Ministers Xuan Thuy and Henry Kissinger in Paris, the US side made a "final" proposal consisting of seven points. This is the first time the US has offered a solution for all of Indochina, but they have separated the military issue and the political issue, although in the past they accepted to discuss the whole package.

On June 26, 1971, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam proposed nine points. Next, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam proposed the Seven-point solution, demanding the withdrawal of American troops from the South in 1971.

On August 16, 1971, the US side made an eight-point proposal. Basically, the US still holds the old position: It doesn't want to solve the whole problem, but only wants to solve the military problem and get the prisoners. The Paris talks, which have been going on for more than three years, are still deadlocked.

On January 25, 1972, US President Richard Nixon unilaterally announced the contents of private meetings on the eight-point proposal made on August 16, 1971.

On January 31, 1972, in Paris, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam delegation announced the nine-point solution, and at the same time pointed out the deception of the White House in violation of the agreement of the two sides not to disclose the content of private meetings, at the suggestion of Henry Kissinger himself. Vietnam also distributed to

all newspapers the notes exchanged between the two sides about the meeting on October 20, 1971.

On February 2, 1972, at the Four-Party Conference, Minister Nguyen Thi Binh clarified two more key issues in the Seven-Point position made on July 1, 1971 by the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

On March 24, 1972, President Richard Nixon announced an indefinite postponement of the public sessions of the Paris Conference on Vietnam. Then, on May 8, 1972, less than a week after a private meeting between Le Duc Tho, Xuan Thuy and Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon announced a new escalation to expand the scale of the invasion of the North, including by strategic air force, mined Hai Phong port and estuaries and creeks in the blockaded waters of North Vietnam.

On July 13, 1972, the United States accepted to reconvene the Four-Party Plenary Conference in Paris.

On 8-10-1972, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam actively submitted a draft "Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam".

On October 22, 1972, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the US completed the text of the Agreement, but soon after, on October 23, 1972, the US raised obstacles to delay the signing of the Agreement. At the same time, the US set up an "Enhance Plus" air bridge to massively supply the Saigon government.

On October 26, 1972, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam announced the agreements that had been reached, and at the same time exposed the perverse and stubborn attitude of Richard Milhous Nixon.

On November 2, 1972, President Richard Nixon ordered B.52 aircraft to attack the North of the Demilitarized Zone.

Then on November 20, 1972, renegotiated, the US demanded to amend most of the substantive issues in the chapters at the request of the Saigon government, and at the same time calculated a new escalation of the war against Vietnam. Democratic Republic.

On December 18, 1972, President Richard Nixon ordered B.52s to bomb Hanoi and Hai Phong to begin "Operation Linebaker II" lasting 12 days and nights, at the same time, the US sent a note to Vietnam to request it meet again.

On January 27, 1973, the Paris Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam was officially signed at the center of international conferences in Paris between the four parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. .

The Paris Agreement on Vietnam includes 9 chapters and 23 articles. The main content of the Agreement is: The United States and other countries commit to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam. The United States completely put an end to the war of aggression, military involvement and interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, respecting the right to self-determination and guaranteeing the democratic liberties of the South Vietnamese people. The people of South Vietnam decide for themselves their political future through a truly free and democratic General Election. The reunification of Vietnam was done by peaceful methods.

The view of the United States towards the withdrawal of North Vietnamese and American troops from South Vietnam

Former US Secretary of Defense from 1960 to 1968, McNamara, mentioned the reasons the US sent troops to fight in the South in the memoir “Looking Back - Tragedy and Lessons about Vietnam”, published in 1995. According to McNamara, the reasons are: Initially to protect airports, warehouses, military bases, important political, military, and economic objectives. of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam; In order to save the collapse of the government and army of the Republic of Vietnam when the special war strategy stood on the verge of failure; Search and destroy the main force of the Liberation Army of the South and units of the North's army, regain the initiative in the battlefield, and prevent the North's reinforcements to the South.

During this meeting, the head of the US delegation A.Harriman rejected the view of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam when considering the US sending combat troops into the South as aggression. A.Harriman said that: the reason there is such a situation as happening in the South is because Hanoi's army invaded; This war was planned, initiated and directed by Hanoi; This is Communist aggression against nationalism in South Vietnam; The entry of American troops into the South was “at the request of the South Vietnamese people to resist Hanoi's aggression by force and terror” (Luu Van Loi, Nguyen Anh Vu, 1996, p.25).

In the third private meeting, on September 15, 1968, referring to the topic of troop withdrawal, A.Harriman explained that the American troops would withdraw later because of the larger number, more weapons and equipment, and suggested that the regional troops North withdraw first.

The fact that the US raised the issue of withdrawing troops from the South was not surprising to the Vietnamese side, for the following reasons:

First, tens of thousands of US troops poured into the South in a short time, only increasing the nature and severity of the war, but did not change the position in favor of the US. The South Vietnamese army and people directly faced and defeated the American units at Nui Thanh (May 26, 1968); Van Tuong (August 18, 1965); Pleime - Iadrang (11-1965). Two strategic counter-attacks in the dry season 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 with tens of thousands of troops, opening dozens of large and small sweeping operations across the battlefields in the South to find and destroy the enemy's main force. But failing to achieve the set goal, the American army still did not gain the initiative in the battlefield and suffered heavy losses.

Second, the 1968 Mau Than General Offensive and Uprising of the South Vietnamese army and people, directly hitting cities and towns, military bases, warehouses, airports, and harbors... at the same time, keeping complete secrecy, surprise... made the US realize a clear fact that military victory could not be won, despite the overwhelming number of American troops and weapons and means of war against the enemy. The main force of the Liberation Army and the North Vietnamese army units not only were not damaged or destroyed, on the contrary, they were also able to launch a large-scale attack on the strongest place of the US and the Vietnamese military government republic.

Third, America's will to continue the war with military might was dealt a fatal blow when the US government bitterly realized another truth: that the hearts and minds of the vast majority of people in the South did not those who lean towards the US, on the contrary,

helped the enemy fight the US, keeping the whole process of the Vietnamese army preparing to attack the cities a secret.

Fourth, the bombing and bombardment of the North by air and naval forces lasted for many years, but still could not prevent reinforcement from the North to the South, and did not weaken the potential of the North.

Fifth, the movement protesting against the senseless and immoral war, demanding the withdrawal of American troops, and ending the war spreading within the United States and around the world, exerted strong pressure on the government of President Ho Chi Minh. President Lyndon Baines Johnson.

The US presidential election of November 1968 resulted in Richard Nixon defeating the Democratic Party's candidate, H. Humphrey, to become the US president. Richard Nixon proposed the strategy of "Vietnamization of war", declaring that he would withdraw American combat troops back home. However, Richard Nixon wanted to withdraw his troops on his strength, but he had to keep the government and army of the Republic of Vietnam. Richard Nixon also instructed the US negotiating team in Paris to insist on the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South.

Reasons for the American side's insistence on the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam:

Firstly, because the US always claims to consider the Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as two countries, although in its heart, the US understands that the reason for the above situation is due to plots and actions to sabotage the Union. America's own Geneva. America's request is to show the Republic of Vietnam that the US always supports them.

Second, the US deliberately equated the aggressor with the anti-aggression, confusing white - black, right - left, in order to reduce the support of countries and international organizations for the resistance war of Vietnam.

Third, the US understands that, with more than half a million mighty soldiers, strong generals, fully equipped and most modern weapons in the world, more than 4 years have passed but have not achieved the set goal, after the US Withdrawal and comparison of forces is even more disparate in favor of Vietnam, the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam regime is only a matter of time. Therefore, the US government had to calculate how many American troops could withdraw and how long it would take for the Saigon army to have a chance to defend itself and how the issue of the Vietnam war would not become a problem. The hottest topic in the US presidential election. Kissinger once emphasized: "on the matter of unconditional withdrawal of US troops...reciprocity is required to establish a balance of forces in the event of such withdrawal".

Vietnam's position on the withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam.

On the Vietnamese side, the Party Central Committee and the Politburo are well aware of the US's indecision and passivity. The Vietnamese Party believes that, even if the North Vietnamese troops do not withdraw, the US troops must withdraw, because more than half a million US troops in the South have not been able to do anything, while being criticized by the political world and the people. The US and world public opinion condemned, put pressure on, US troops could not withdraw. It was the US's acceptance of

negotiations with Vietnam that was the clearest expression of the US government's "tired of the Vietnam War" mood. Vietnam understands this very well, so it firmly holds the point of view: this is the country of Vietnam, the Vietnamese, wherever they are in the territory of Vietnam, have the obligation and responsibility to participate in the fight to repel the enemy. Comrade First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party of Vietnam instructed the negotiating team: Comrades, you can do whatever you want, but you must definitely achieve the goal: the American troops will withdraw, but the Vietnamese will stay..

Right at the first joint meetings (May 13, 1968), the head of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Xuan Thuy, accused the US of sending troops to invade the South, bombard the North, demanding the US stop the war, withdrawing troops back home, letting the Vietnamese people settle their affairs. The head of the American delegation, A.Harriman, also said that the North invaded the South, violating the regulations on the demilitarized zone...and also demanded the withdrawal of the North's army from the South.

On June 12, 1968, a month after the opening of the Paris Conference, Le DucTho, Politburo member, in charge of the organization of the Vietnam Labor Party, arrived in Paris as a Special Advisor to Minister Xuan Thuy. The presence of one of the top leaders of the Party shows that the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam attaches great importance to and sincerely wants to resolve the war by negotiation.

The second private meeting between fellow Le DucTho and A.Harriman took place on September 12, 1968. During the meeting, Le DucTho criticized and rejected the unreasonable request of the US, which was reflected in the previous statement of the US Deputy Head of the US delegation Vance when demanding that the North Vietnamese army withdraw from the South and the US army would complete the withdrawal six months after the North's withdrawal.

During the four-way meeting on May 8, 1969, Mr. Tran BuuKiem, representing the Delegation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, proposed a 10-point solution, including a new content: "Vietnam's armed forces in the South are resolved by the South parties". This proposal paved the way for the US to withdraw with honor while still being able to keep the Saigon Government (including the armed forces), which the Vietnamese side had never acknowledged before. Although Vietnam had made such a concession, US President Richard Nixon, on May 14, 1969, still demanded that both American and North Vietnamese troops withdraw within 12 months after signing the Agreement, still keeping the Saigon government in charge. He also "agrees for the Front to participate in political life in South Vietnam, to participate in free, internationally supervised and controlled general elections".

On July 17, 1969, Ho Chi Minh announced on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Accords: "The Vietnamese people resolutely demand that all American troops and American vassal troops be withdrawn, not just 25,000 or 250,000 or 500,000, but must withdraw all, without conditions"(Luu Van Loi, Nguyen Anh Vu, 1996, p.94).

In a private meeting with Kissinger, National Security Adviser of the US President, Advisor to the US Delegation at the Paris Conference, Minister Xuan Thuy emphasized the plot of the US to withdraw its troops on a drip, disproportionate to when oh Massively sending troops in, considering this as a policy of the US, does not reflect goodwill in

negotiations. Kissinger offered a tactic: “You can adjust the speed of our withdrawal by the speed of your withdrawal. If you do not want to consider American forces and those of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to be the same, then we can discuss another method in which differences are preserved.

It is clear that the US wants to set a trap, and wants the Vietnamese side to automatically admit the withdrawal of troops - something that the US knows for sure that Vietnam will never accept. Henry Kissinger's statement further showed that in the matter of negotiating to withdraw forces from the South, the US was always in a weak position, although it actively had to withdraw its troops, it was passive in asking the Vietnamese troops to withdraw together. This reflects the weakness of the US.

Despite this, the issue of troop withdrawal continued to be a contentious topic on the conference table between Vietnam and the United States throughout the following years.

In the first meeting between Henry Kissinger and Special Advisor Le Duc Tho, on February 21, 1970 in Paris, Henry Kissinger mentioned this issue with a softer attitude: “We (the US) admit it. You have the particular problem of placing your troops in South Vietnam on the same legal basis as the American troops in South Vietnam. We know that you never officially acknowledged that you had an army in South Vietnam and never acknowledged that it was a foreign army in South Vietnam. We acknowledge the matter, we respect your attitude on this matter. The Vietnamese tried to see if there could be a solution to this particularly difficult problem, a practical solution, not a theoretical one...we had to admit that neither side had One can assume that the other side will give up at the negotiating table what they refuse to give up on the battlefield”(Luu Van Loi, Nguyen Anh Vu, 1996, p.106).

Henry Kissinger's point of view shows a clear signal: The US has no basis and no reason to ask the North's army to withdraw from the South and the US also understands that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam side will steadfastly stand. This comes along on the conference table. Meanwhile, the US still has to continue the process of withdrawing combat troops back home.

In subsequent joint and private meetings, the US side always repeated the request: in the withdrawal “actually requires reciprocity to some extent, and that is why Vietnam has I'm here to negotiate”.

One thing to note is that, despite being in a weak position in negotiations on the withdrawal of troops, the US side still tries to exert pressure and set conditions to force the Democratic Republic of Vietnam side to make concessions. It is a bargaining campaign with the Soviet Union, China to reduce aid to Vietnam, in return, the US will give these countries military, political, and economic incentives... That is attaching the withdrawal of troops with other political issues.

Rejecting the US request, Advisor Le Duc Tho pointed out the absurdity of Henry Kissinger's argument: “According to him (Henry Kissinger), the withdrawal of all American troops and allied troops of the United States is a legal principles. As for the withdrawal of troops that you consider to be from the North, it is not a legal principle but a practical and technical matter. But when he presented the issue of withdrawing troops, which you called the North's, must also be completed in the same time, so in essence it was also asking both sides to withdraw their troops and withdraw all of them... The deadline for withdrawal (USA) is a step back from the time you mentioned in Kléber. The way to withdraw troops that he

presented was even trickier than the plan of Vietnamization... So he said that it was practical and should not be bargained, then that statement was contrary to this reality”(Luu Van Loi, Nguyen Anh Vu, 1996, p.152-155).

Ms. Nguyen ThiBinh, head of the delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam at the Paris conference on September 17, 1970, made an 8-point proposal, which required the US and its allies to American forces must withdraw from the South by June 30, 1971, and the armed forces for the liberation will not attack the withdrawing American troops.

Even in the United States, members of the House of Representatives and Senators in the Senate of the United States Congress have introduced many bills demanding to limit the president's power to administer the war, demanding a deadline for unilateral withdrawal. American troops out of Vietnam to bring American prisoners home.

In 1971, regarding the issue of troop withdrawal, the US “lowered its voice”, pledged to withdraw all US troops and asked “the North Vietnamese to commit to a cease-fire during the withdrawal of US troops”. This view shows for the first time that the US did not attach the issue of the two sides to withdraw their troops. However, the US still proposed that “the Vietnamese and the people of Indochina will discuss with each other how to withdraw all other foreign forces from Indochina” and “not to be added to the Indochinese countries foreign forces”.

In 1971, 1972, although the withdrawal process continued, the US side deliberately avoided setting a deadline for withdrawing all US combat troops from the South for the purpose of attaching to the protection of army and the Saigon government and brought American POWs home. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese side persisted and resolutely demanded that the US set a deadline for the quick withdrawal and the withdrawal of all US troops back home. Until July 1, 1972, the number of American troops in the South was only 69,000 people. On the contrary, the forces of North Vietnam returned to the South one by one after a period of time having to withdraw to Cambodia, Laos and to the North. The US has clearly shown its inability to prevent the main Vietnamese units from entering the South, let alone its surrender when demanding that the North Vietnamese troops withdraw from the South.

In early October 1972, combined with strong military offensive activities on the battlefields of Tri Thien, Central Highlands, and Southeast, Vietnam's negotiating team actively produced a draft agreement with many contents. Concession means breakthrough, making the negotiation take a decisive turning point. The US side has acknowledged the goodwill of Vietnam. Regarding the withdrawal of troops, the US only made one proposal: a certain unit of the North organize a symbolic withdrawal with video and photography; The US will use those images to tell the world and Saigon public that the North is also withdrawing. However, this seemingly gentle proposal of the US was also rejected by the Vietnamese side.

After passing the election for a second term, US President Richard Nixon used the excuse that Nguyen Van Thieu government was opposed to the provisions of the draft agreement, and asked the North Vietnamese troops to withdraw from the South. The Vietnamese side flatly rejected the US request, accepting to face the strategic air raid of the B52 and defeat the US. The victory of the 12-day air defense campaign at the end of 1972

forced the US to return to the negotiating table and sign the Paris Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam (January 27, 1973).

CONCLUDE

In nearly 5 years, an unprecedented length of negotiation history, with 201 public meetings, 45 high-level private meetings, 500 press conferences, 1000 interviews, hundreds of rallies in support of Vietnam. In the south, the diplomatic struggle of the Vietnamese people in Paris has really made an important contribution to the resistance war to unify the Vietnamese Fatherland.

With the synergy of the struggle on the military, political and diplomatic fronts. Vietnam was determined and persistent in its goal: To force the US to end the war in Vietnam, withdraw from Vietnam and Indochina, stop its military involvement, and create favorable conditions for the development of the revolution.

The Paris Agreement was signed, the Republic of Vietnam lost its military support, was weakened and plunged into a political crisis; The United States must retreat strategically, deepen the trend of military withdrawal from Indochina and avoid a second Vietnam. The Paris Agreement is the legal basis that does not allow the US to continue to get involved and interfere again. The Agreement also confirmed the fact that the South had two governments, two armies, two control zones; creating conditions for Vietnam to maintain its military and political forces, as a basis for the southern revolution to advance.

The 1973 Paris Agreement reflects a high level of success in the favorable but complicated international context. Vietnam has enlisted the Soviet Union, China, socialist countries, non-aligned countries and the people of the world, formed in fact “the world people's front in support of Vietnam against the US invasion”. The formation of the world people's front in support of the Vietnamese people has demonstrated the motto of combining national strength with the strength of the times, national strength with international strength, combining state diplomacy with people's diplomacy.

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